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Abstract. We present an analysis of implicative verbs,1 complement-
taking verbs which induce entailment-like inferences, but which are also
claimed to trigger presuppositions. What is presupposed, however, is
much more variable than with e.g. factive verbs. Sketching a formal treat-
ment in Logical Description Grammar we consider the role of pragmatic
reasoning and accommodation in deriving these presuppositions.
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1 Introduction
Since Karttunen’s work on implicatives in English [K71a] [K71b], verbs such
as ‘to manage to’, ‘to forget to’, ‘to happen to’, or ‘to force to’, etc., have be-
come known for their characteristic inference pattern. On the one hand, they are
claimed to entail or implicate the truth or falsity of their complement sentence,
depending on the polarity of the embedding construction. For instance, we have
(1) a. Jim managed to button his coat.
→ Jim buttoned his coat.
b. Jim did not manage to button his coat.
Jim did not happen to manage to button his coat.
→ Jim did not button his coat.
Various subclasses can be distinguished. Following [NCK06], ‘to manage to’
might be called a two-way implicative, because it triggers an entailment both
in its unnegated and its negated form; moreover, it may be called aﬃrmative
because it implies the truth of the complement sentence in its bare, unnegated
form.
On the other, implicative verbs are often claimed to evoke presuppositions .
Verbs of success or failure are taken to presuppose that there is or was an attempt
on the subject’s part to achieve the state or event described by the complement
sentence. In addition, ‘to manage to’ is often said to presuppose that there is
some diﬃculty to be overcome in order to achieve the complement state or event.
Thus, both (1a) and (1b) would presuppose2, variously,
1 This research was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Sci-
entific Research (NWO), which is gratefully acknowledged.
2 Some papers, notably [KP79], classify these inferences as conventional implicatures.
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(2)  Jim made an attempt to button his coat.
 It was diﬃcult for Jim to button his coat.
Verbs of forgetting or remembering are often taken to presuppose that there is
or was an obligation on the subject’s part to achieve the state or event described
by the complement sentence. More tentatively, it is suggested that these verbs
evoke the supposition that the subject intends to achieve the complement state
or event, or that, less speciﬁcally, he is expected to do so, or ought to do so.
Moreover, most implicatives evoke what may be called characteristic causal
or explanatory presuppositions: reasons why the state or event denoted by the
complement sentence is or is not achieved in the case at hand. This comes out
perhaps most clearly in cases such as (3) where the implicative is negated,
(3) Ed didn’t manage / remember / bother / dare / happen to open the door.
all of which imply that Ed did not open the door but presuppose a diﬀerent
reason for this fact. Ed did not make a suﬃcient eﬀort or was not suﬃciently
skilled to open the door, he did not keep in mind his plan or obligation to close
it, he did not care enough or did not take the trouble, he did not have suﬃcient
courage, or somehow the right circumstances did not apply.
While most of the early descriptive literature [K71a] [Giv73] and some more
recent papers [Luz99] [NCK06] concentrate on the entailments or implications
of sentences with implicative verbs, the focus of this paper is on their presup-
positional side. In particular, we are concerned with the variability of the pre-
suppositions — if indeed that is what they are. We will investigate how these
inferences may come about, and consider what that means for the interaction
between general pragmatic reasoning and the satisfaction of lexical presupposi-
tional conditions in a dynamic semantic perspective on sentence meaning.
Existing treatments of implicatives within the dynamic semantic paradigm,
e.g. [Bea01], tend to treat them exclusively as presupposition triggers and of-
ten only provide an analysis of the bench-mark case ‘to manage to’. We aim to
improve on this in the following way. Firstly, if we want to account for the pre-
suppositions of implicatives, we cannot pass by their implications or entailments.
Only on the basis of their full inferential signature may the core semantic con-
tent of implicative sentences be teased apart from any requirements on context
they induce. What is presupposed then follows from the interaction with general
pragmatic reasoning. Secondly, it is fruitful to look at implicatives other than
‘to manage to’, which happens to be one that induces virtually uncancellable
implications both in its bare and negated form. Not all implicative verbs are like
that, and we will zoom in on a slightly weaker instance, namely ‘to remember
to’.
Finally, the status of the inferences under discussion as presuppositions can
be called into question. While some of them can be viewed as scalar and con-
versational implicatures, we propose that most of them are ‘pragmatic presup-
positions’ (Stalnaker), or ‘secondary inferences’ that result from the need to
satisfy and explain a basic appropriateness condition of the implicative verb.
They constitute accommodated material in the wide sense of [Tho90].
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Our analysis is couched in Logical Description Grammar for discourse, a model
of text interpretation which combines underspeciﬁcation with discourse theory,
and uses compositional DRT as semantic representation language. Unlike most
dynamic semantic formalisms, it supports a liberal notion of accommodation,
where what is accommodated can be more than what is minimally required to
satisfy conditions on contexts, in terms of logical strength. What comes out
as a most preferred context speciﬁcation follows from the interaction with the
interpreting agent’s common knowledge and pragmatic reasoning. Thus, on the
basis of a suﬃciently general requirement on a context, a variety of more speciﬁc
suppositions can be abduced.
We start oﬀ with a sketch of the LDG formalism, highlighting what is relevant
for the topic at hand. Our analysis of implicative verbs is laid down in subsequent
sections. For reasons of space, we concentrate on the core proposal and economize
on discussion of data.
2 Discourse Meaning and Accommodation in LDG
The LDG framework of discourse interpretation, laid down in [LM03] [Leu07],
consists of a description grammar, which embodies a language user’s linguistic
knowledge, a representation of his world knowledge and beliefs, and a preference
system, which models his capacity to assign preferences over diﬀerent potential
interpretations of a discourse and to draw default inferences. In processing a
discourse, the language user incrementally constructs a discourse description
from input sentence descriptions. It describes the speciﬁc syntactic, semantic,
and pragmatic properties of the discourse.
Descriptions are sets of statements in a logical language (classical type logic, in
our case). The objects described by sentence and discourse descriptions are fully
speciﬁed linguistic tree structures. Interpretation is a reasoning task, in which
the hearer infers what tree structures ﬁt or verify the discourse description given
his grammar and nonlinguistic knowledge. As descriptions can be partial, there
can be more than one verifying tree structure. Each structure comes with a
potential reading of the sentence or discourse, and one or more of them may
come out as most preferred.
See [Leu07] for an explication of the incrementality of the formalism and the
speciﬁcs of the parsing process. A central feature of the model is that it makes
available local contexts as a parameter in the compositional semantics. Each
node k in a sentence or discourse tree comes not just with the usual syntactic
categories and semantic values (σk), but also carries a local context (Γk). Local
contexts are constructed from semantic values going top-down and from left to
right through the discourse tree. The local context of the root of a discourse
tree is identiﬁed with B, the implicit background to the discourse. B stands for
whatever is taken for granted or pragmatically presupposed by the discourse
participants in the view of the interpreting agent.
Crucially, local contexts are underspeciﬁed objects; accommodation is the
(partial) speciﬁcation of local contexts as it results from the satisfaction of
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constraints stated on them in the grammar and the discourse description. The
implicit background is a largely underspeciﬁed body of information which is de-
scribed bit by bit in the course of the interpretation process. We call this context
speciﬁcation.3
The discourse grammar speciﬁes a few general conditions on local contexts,
and elements the lexicon may introduce speciﬁc ones. Typically, context-sensitive
elements such as anaphors and presupposition triggers contribute the latter. Dis-
course meaning is deﬁned as B⊕σr, i.e., what was ‘taken for granted’ merged or
updated with ‘what was said’, where all the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic
conditions collected in the discourse description must be satisﬁed, including con-
straints on local contexts. To illustrate, the discourse meaning of the out-of-the-
blue sentence in (4a) is shown in (4b), where, among others, the requirements
on B in (4c) and (4d) must be satisﬁed.
(4) a. Ed closed the door.
b. B ⊕ [ | wr: o0 closed σπ3 ]
c. triggered by the name: [o0 | wr:Ed o0]  B
d. triggered by the deﬁnite description: [σπ3 | ]  B, B | [ | wr: door σπ3 ]
Semantic values are in a variant of compositional DRT put forward in [LM03]. σπk
is an underspeciﬁed discourse marker. [..|...] is a DRS, to the left of the | sign is
the universe, to the right the conditions. We use ok, uk, wr, . . . for diﬀerent types
of discourse markers; uk represent new referents (generated in the discourse); ok
represent old ones; wr stores the actual world. ‘wr : door u3’ should be read as
‘the occupant of u3 is a door in the world occupying wr’. The operator ⊕ merges
DRSs,  denotes inclusion and | denotes entailment .
The hearer may satisfy (4c) and (4d) by accepting [o0 | wr:Ed o0]  B and
[ u7 | wr: door u7]  B (where u7 is an arbitrary fresh discourse marker). By
further reasoning the hearer may obtain (5) as ﬁnal discourse meaning:
(5) B ⊕ [wr, o0, u7 | wr:Ed o0, wr : o0 closed u7, wr: door u7]
Note that this interpretation builds on accommodation: the hearer adjusts his
representation of the implicit background in order to satisfy linguistically gen-
erated requirements.
A hearer may freely abduce background information, selecting a context sce-
nario which is most likely to explain what is presupposed, and consistent with
what he considers to be common knowledge and the speaker’s beliefs and inten-
tions in making his assertion. What is accommodated in any given case is not
just a matter of satisfying presuppositional conditions, it depends on the total
of the hearer’s beliefs and preferences. Pragmatic reasoning is indispensible for
generating preferences over accommodation options. We assume the preference
system of the model implements a form of defeasible reasoning about what the
speaker is committing to given his beliefs and intentions and what he said so far.
The pragmatic rules are not formally speciﬁed, but we consider their impact in
the interpretation process.
3 [Leu07] provides a treatment of local and intermediate accommodation as well.
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3 Reasoning towards Culmination
Right from the birth of ‘implicative verbs’ as a distinct class in [K71a], there
has been discussion about the strength or status of the derived complements.
In [NCK06], Karttunen and co-authors point out that “it can be diﬃcult to
distinguish entailments that is, what the author is actually committed to, and
conversational implicatures, that is, what a reader/hearer may feel entitled
to infer.” Indeed, judgements may vary. For instance, ‘to remember to’ is viewed
as a two-way implicative in [NCK06], but we prefer to categorise it as a one-way
implicative, in line with [Horn72]. Consider
(6) a. Martha remembered to turn out the lights.
b. Martha turned out the lights.
c. Martha didn’t remember to turn out the lights.
d. Martha didn’t turn out the lights.
e. (i) ... so I had to remind her.
(ii) ... but luckily she brushed against the switch.
While (6a) implies (6b) in a strong sense, (6c) only ‘invites the inference’ in (6d).
As can be seen from the continuations in (6e), the inference is defeasible. Horn
categorises it as a subspecies of implicature.
The strong inferences can be recognised by their resistance to cancellation:
(7) a. # Though Jim managed to button his coat, he did not button it.
b. ?? Though Martha remembered to call the dean, she didn’t call him.
It can be hard to determine whether the inference arises and is cancelled or not,
however. For one, some verbal constructions, e.g. ‘to be able to’, are ambiguous
between implicative and nonimplicative senses. In other cases, strong contrastive
marking may override the implicative inference, or select a nonimplicative sense
of the construction. Moreover, the inferences are temporally speciﬁc [Giv73];
they inherit, among more, the temporal setting of the implicative predicate.
Thus, (8a) constitutes no evidence of cancellation, the continuation in (8a) is
simply consistent with the inference (8b):4
(8) a. Martha didn’t remember to turn out the lights (t1), but she turned
them out later on (t2, t1 < t2).
b. Martha didn’t turn out the lights (at t1)
Finally, the inferences depend on the tense and aspect of the implicative predi-
cate. The clearcut ‘actuality entailments’ evoked with simple past predicates do
not surface with a generic or progressive use of the same verb. Arguably, these
uses evoke generic and progressive implicative inferences.
4 Perhaps a two-way analysis of ‘to remember to’ can be defended along these lines.
426 N. van Leusen
Analysis As [Luz99] observes, implicatives always occur as part of a sequence of
verbs expressing a single process. We may add that in general, that process is
resultative. The implicative verb refers to an attitude or state of the subject or an
activity he is involved in, which in the view of the speaker is a necessary prestate,
or causes, or culminates in the state or event referred to by the complement
sentence. In line with the intuitive analysis of [K71a], we suggest that in the
context of interpretation, the implicative state or activity ﬁgures as a suﬃcient
and/or necessary condition for the achievement or culmination (or lack thereof)
of the complement state or event. This explains the implicative inferences.
We’ll come to a formal implementation of this shortly, but like to emphasize
that, ultimately, pragmatics is what drives these inferences, and what explains
why implicative verb senses come into existence in a language. There is a general
pragmatic drift to expect that a process culminates or a purpose is achieved or
an intention made true, when a speaker asserts that a precondition for the result
or goal is satisﬁed or that an intentional act took place. And when he conveys
that a precondition is not fulﬁlled, we expect that the result or the goal is not
achieved. In the course of time, for some verbs the implicativeness can become
conventionalised and part of their lexical description. Specialisation may take
place, resulting in groups of semantically closely related verbs which diﬀer only
in the optionality or obligatoriness of the implication they evoke. Verbs which
express the same core meaning across languages can be expected to diﬀer in the
strength of the implicative inference.
4 The Implicative Condition
We propose that implicative verbs lexically introduce an implicative condition, a
requirement on their local context which deﬁnes the resultative, causal or condi-
tional relation between the state or action the implicative verb refers to, and the
state or event described by the complement sentence. In combination with the
semantic content of the sentence containing the verb, it accounts for the implica-
tive inferences in context. The one-way implicative ‘to remember to’ presupposes,
we propose, a suﬃcient condition: in the relevant local context, remembering to
close the door results in a door-closing. Suppose a hearer computes the discourse
meaning of out-of-the-blue sentence (9a). At some point he may have inferred
(9b), while the implicative condition (9c) must still be satisﬁed.
(9) a. Ed remembered to close the door.
b. B ⊕ [wr o0 t1 |wr:Ed o0,
wr :remember .at (o0, λw, t[ |w :o0 close.door .at t], t1), t1 < n ]
c. Implicative condition, contributed by the inﬂected verb:
B |
[ | [ t1 |wr :remember .at (o0, λw, t[ |w :o0 close.door .at t], t1), t1 < n ] ⇒
[ t2 |wr : o0 close.door .at t2, t1 © t2, t2 < n ] ]
Various accommodation options arise. The one shown in (10a) can be excluded
because it sins against a grammatical constraint: B must be a proper DRS but
would contain free discourse marker t1. The other two are viable options.
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(10) a. [ t2 |wr : o0 close.door .at t2, t1 © t2, t2 < n ]  B
b. [ | [ t1 |wr :remember .at (o0, λw, t[ |w :o0 close.door .at t], t1), t1 < n ] ⇒
[ t2 |wr : o0 close.door .at t2, t1 © t2, t2 < n ] ]  B
c. [ | [ t1 |wr :remember .at (o0, λw, t[ |w :o0 close.door .at t], t1), t1 < n ] ⇔
[ t2 |wr : o0 close.door .at t2, t1 © t2, t2 < n ] ]  B
Considering what would explain the speaker’s use of an implicative in the given
context, the hearer might assume that he simply intends to describe a state
of aﬀairs and takes for granted that Ed remembering to close the door in the
situation at hand is suﬃcient to make him close it. Thus the hearer would accept
option (10b). However, he may go on to ask what makes the speaker mention Ed’s
remembering at all, if he could have said right away that Ed opened the door.
Quite possibly because in the situation under discussion, the speaker considers
it a necessary requirement as well: without remembering to close the door Ed
would not have closed it. If, in addition, Ed’s remembering is relevant in the
sense that it is an open issue in the discourse whether he did or not, the speaker
has good reasons to mention it. Now the hearer accepts (10c).
The indefeasibility of the implicative inference with the bare positive use of
the verb is now accounted for, because there is no grammatical interpretation in
which the implicative condition is not satisﬁed. With the negated form, however,
only the interpretation corresponding to option (10c) predicts the implicative in-
ference. We suggest that this is the preferred option in principle.5 The implicative
inference is then predicted to arise with the negated form in out-of-the-blue use
and in linguistic contexts such as (6e.i) which reinforce the inference. But when
it is disconﬁrmed, as in (6e.ii), the hearer selects accommodation option (10b).
Typically, the continuation in (6e.ii) conveys that there is another action beside
remembering that would result in Martha turning out the lights on the relevant
occasion. So the speaker does not consider Martha’s remembering a necessary
requirement. The availability of accommodation option (10b) accounts for the
defeasibility of the implicative inference with the negated form.
Because the implicative condition is ‘presuppositional’, i.e. a requirement on
local context, the resultative or conditional link constitutes non-at issue informa-
tion. It will commonly project to global context, unless forced to accommodate
locally, e.g. through metalinguistic denial. As such it is employed by the hearer
in the computation of discourse meaning. More complex examples in which one
implicative construction embeds another will be interesting test-cases. If the var-
ious preconditions project to global context, the implicative inferences evoked
by the sentence should follow from their interaction in the spirit of [K71b].
Furthermore, the implicative condition is stated in the domain of locality
of the implicative verb and ﬁres relative to its local context. This has some
important consequences, which space restrictions allow us only to mention here.
One is that entailments which hold locally do not necessarily surface globally.
Thus, it can be explained that when triggered in the scope of e.g. modal and
5 In terms of pragmatic rules, it provides a ‘better explanation’ of the speaker’s use
of an implicative.
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generic operators the implicative inference is not evoked. Another is that it solves
the notorious ‘binding problem’, detected in [KP79].
Every implicative verb comes with its own characteristic implicative condition.
In the case of ‘to manage to’, we follow the general trend (cf. [Bea01]) and assume
that its semantic content says that the complement state or event obtains. The
entailments with both the positive and the negated use of the verb follow from
this straight away, and are predicted to be indefeasible. Instead of the usual
attempt/diﬃculty-presupposition, however, we’ll have an implicative condition
which says that the complement state or event holds only if the subject individual
makes an eﬀort (of at least degree d) to obtain that result:
(11) a. Someone managed to close the door.
b. B ⊕ [u1 |wr :human u1, wr :u1 close.door .at t1, t1<n]
c. B ⊕ [u1 |wr :human u1 ] | [ | [ t1|wr :u1 close.door .at t1, t1<n ] ⇒
[ t2|wr :put .eﬀort .d≤.in.at (u1, λw, t[ |w : u1 close.door .at t], t2),
t2 © t1, t2<n ] ]
This diﬀers minimally from standard treatments in that the requirement that an
eﬀort be made is a postcondition on the succes of the complement state or event,
and is formulated in somewhat less speciﬁc terms than attempt or diﬃculty.
5 Linguistic Presuppositions or Pragmatic
Strengthening?
While any speciﬁc implicative verb can carry additional presuppositions, we are
interested to see how far the implicative condition may take us in accounting for
the presuppositions claimed to be evoked by implicatives, given interaction with
pragmatic reasoning. Remember the presuppositions are a diverse lot; focusing
on ‘to manage to’ we will go through them one by one.
The implicative condition accounts directly for the characteristic causal or
explanatory presuppositions mentioned in the introduction. Satisfying the im-
plicative condition in (11c), the hearer may accommodate that for anybody to
close the door on the particular occasion under discussion, he must make a cer-
tain eﬀort, and doing so will cause the closing of the door. If we are told that
a subject did not manage to close the door, then not having made that eﬀort
is a likely explanation of why he didn’t close it. Thus, the satisfaction of the
implicative condition induces the accommodation of explanatory suppositions.
Now for the attempt suppositions . The hearer may very well satisfy the im-
plicative condition by accommodating that opening the door on this occasion
requires an intentional, active attempt to do so on the agent’s part. This is a
plausible instance of putting in a certain eﬀort. Arguably, with a positive use of
the verb the attempt-inference is defeasible in examples like the following. The
less speciﬁc inference signals that the implicative condition is still satisﬁed:
(12) Without intending it, Bill managed to insult the dean.
	 Bill attempted to insult the dean.
 Bill was involved in some eﬀort which resulted in insulting the dean.
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With the negated use of the implicative (and a neutral stress pattern), as in
(13) Jack didn’t manage to convince the dean.
the hearer is predicted to infer that the subject did not make the eﬀort necessary
to cause convincing the dean. In general, however, a more speciﬁc inference is
evoked, namely that Jack did make an eﬀort, though an insuﬃcient one. This
reading results from selecting a logically stronger context speciﬁcation. Among
the factors which can explain the preference for this reading, we suggest Gricean-
style scalar reasoning is a central one. Given satisfaction of the implicative con-
dition, in context ‘Jack did not put a suﬃcient eﬀort into convincing the dean’
is a stronger alternative than ‘Jack did not convince the dean.’ Presumably, the
speaker didn’t communicate the stronger alternative because he doesn’t believe
that Jack did not put a suﬃcient eﬀort into convincing the dean. If the speaker is
informed about the matter, it follows that he believes that Jack tried to convince
the dean. Thus analysing the inference as a scalar implicature, its defeasibility
in constructions such as (14) is predicted.
(14) Jack didn’t manage to convince the dean, in fact, he didn’t even try.
The diﬃculty suppositions are naturally accounted for as an accommodation
eﬀect of satisfying the implicative condition. If it requires an eﬀort on Jack’s part
to convince the dean, then probably there is some diﬃculty or challenge involved
in this, which explains why the eﬀort is needed. A most preferred context does
not just make the implicative condition true but also plausible in the situation
under discussion. Testing in projection and cancellation contexts reveals that the
diﬃculty suppositions are generally persistent, often generic, but always adapted
to the situation under discussion given common knowledge. The diﬃculty may
be speciﬁc to the subject given his opportunities and skills, as in (2), it can be
a diﬃculty in the action or goal to be achieved for anybody in general, or it can
be completely contingent on the situation at hand. All of this is to be expected
when the inference is not hard-wired as a linguistic presupposition, but rather the
product of context speciﬁcation. Finally, the implicative condition is suﬃciently
unspeciﬁc to account for cases like the following in which the eﬀort made by the
subject on the event referred to does not involve any concrete diﬃculty.
(15) John generally runs 10 miles per hour. Small wonder he managed to run 5
miles in 30 minutes yesterday.
	 It was diﬃcult for John to run 5 miles in 30 minutes yesterday.
 It is diﬃcult for most people to run 5 miles in 30 minutes.
 For John to run 5 miles in 30 minutes requires a certain eﬀort.
A discussion of suppositions of expectation or norm and those of obligation at-
tached to ‘to remember to’ shall have to wait for another occasion. We hope to
have shown that an analysis in terms of implicative condition, pragmatic reason-
ing and accommodation eﬀect is well-suited to account for the variability and
defeasibility of the inferences under discussion.
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6 Conclusion
We looked into the inferential behavour of implicative verbs, and argued that
they contribute a presuppositional constraint that characterises the process they
describe as resultative, culminating in the state or event described by the comple-
ment sentence. It was proposed that what are often claimed to be presuppositions
can be accounted for as implicatures or secondary inferences resulting from the
need to satisfy and explain the implicative condition of the verb. The analysis
builds on a liberal notion of accommodation, where pragmatic reasoning rules
serve to generate preferences over accommodation options.
Further research is needed, especially the interactions with tense, aspect and
modality must be spelled out. More extensive testing of the projection behaviour
of inferences and cancellation contexts is needed. Cross-linguistic research will be
helpful to get a grasp on the diversity of implicitive word senses within the lan-
guage system. Moreover, the explicit speciﬁcation of pragmatic reasoning rules
that justify the selection of accommodation options constitutes a theoretical
challenge. The investigation of implicative verbs will be of interest for the the-
ory of presupposition as well as the theory of pragmatics/accommodation. If
implicative verbs are to ﬁnd their place within the family of projective elements,
a rich semantic-pragmatic interpretational system is called for. This might be
LDG for discourse, or a model of comparable strength.
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